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Swedish Enterprises 
in Latin America 1900-1940 
By Harald R~lnblom 
Sweden has consistently had a negative balance in its trade with 
Latin America. From the period of the Latin American countries' 
ljberation to the end 'of the 19th century, Swedish trade with this 
part of the world comprised mainly the iimportation of colonial 
products. The traditional Swedish export products-wood and iron 
in a relatively cr~tde form-had negligible sales in these remote 
regions. However, the* situation changed during the decades around 
the turn of the century. Previously factors connected with the 
economics of transport had placed obstacles in the way of the export 
to Latin Amerlica 'of the most important commodities that Sweden 
had to offer in commercial exchanges. There was a different state 
of affairs as reganded the new products which were now gradually 
coming into the picture, including beacons, milk separators, tele- 
phones and ball ~bearings, which were all highly finished products. 
These products were not sulbject to the same di~fficulties in connec- 
tion with transport economics as iron and wood. On the conltrary, 
it seemed both advisa~ble and attractive to seek large world-wide 
markets for such products and it is significant that the firms which 
manufactured them built up foreign sales organizations at a very 
rapid rate. 
This article is a survey of the results from my doctoral disserta- 
tion, which concerns the activities of Swedish firms which estab- 
lished subsidiaries ,in that part of the wor1d.l The terminal date is 
1939. Thc lack of usable statistics concerning the export and im- 
port of  foreign exchange for Sweden during the period discussed 
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makes it impossible to give a statistical analysis of the total scale 
on &ich the Swedish foreign subsidiaries were established. On 
account of the small size of these establishlnents in the Latin Ameri- 
can regions, a study of thcir development in the owntries in which 
they were established woubd seem to be either impossible or a t  
any rate not of any great interest. Instead my purpose has been 
to elucidate the actual process af establishment, to determine the 
nature of the companics established and to ascertain in what stages 
these establishments took place in relation to the total foreign ac- 
tivities of the parent coinpailics and in relation to the particular 
company's sitiuatioii on the respective markets. The assessments 
which the companies made oC the ccoiiomic and political situations 
in the different countries have been a matter of essential concern. 
Furthermore the relations 01 the companics with the aluthorities 
have been a main theme. The main basis of the investigation is 
material from the archives of the companies studied. The investiga- 
tion was rendered difficult partly because several of the availible 
archives proved to have been very severely pruned and/or to bear 
the marks of neglect in earlier perliods. 
The establishment of Swedish subsidiaries before the Second 
World War is found to be heavily concentrated in Europe. Gradually, 
and particularly after the Second World War, other continents 
became increasingly important, a development in which the role 
of Latin America is particularly noticeable. Before the Second World 
War three Swedish companies ha)d several subsidiaries in Latin 
America, namely, AGA, STAB and AB Svenska Kullagerfabriken 
(SKF) (the last-lmentioned is not included in the investigation). 
Patterns of establishment 
The AGA company (its earlier name was Svenska AB Gasacoumula- 
tor) was founded in 1904. The basis of the company's expansion 
was the inventions procluced by Gustaf Dalkn, one of the founders 
of the company, in the period 1905-1907. These inventions were 
the occulting apparatus for beacons, >,Aga compoundr and the 
solar valve. Within a few years AGA was selling its products all 
over the world. 
The establishment of AGA subsidiaries in Latin America may 
be divided into three stages. T h e  first stage (1906-1910) involved 
the establishment of contacts in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 
where the contact men were intended to arrange sales of AGA 
products, chiefly to the Government services. The terms of sale 
mealit that the contact men purchased equipment from AGA and 
had themselves to take the risk iilvolved in the sales. D~uring this 
period appreciable results were achieved only in Chile. T h e  second 
stage (1910-1915) was inaug~lrated when A. R. Nordvall, the 
sales manager, went on a tolur of South Anlcrica in 1910. His 
principal task was to regularize the contacts and give them a more 
permanent character a i d  to initiate business deals with Govern- 
ments in the Latin American countries in which AGA had not had 
any contacts. Nordvall made agreements with the AGA representa- 
tivcs and general agencies were established. During the period 1910- 
1915 extensive sales of beacons were made, principally to Argen- 
tina, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, and these successes may be de- 
scribed as a result of Nordvall's energetic and skilful negotiations. 
During the First World War the Latin American contacts were 
largely suspended. T h e  third stage may be said to have begun after 
the end of the war. This stage was characterized by the formation 
of subsidiary companies in several Latin American countries, and 
in this way the AGA company acquired a well-established position 
in these countries. 
The AGA company did not endeavour to find any uniform solu- 
tion to the problem of representation in the various countries but 
sought contacts with persons and firms which had established posi- 
tions. A natural and clearly expressed requirement in its choice of 
agents was that they should have established contacts with the public 
administration and preferably )directly with the Government. Cen- 
tral America and Mexico and a couple of countries in the northern 
part of South America were served from the AGA subsidiary in 
Philadelphia. When the North American company came into being 
in 1907, it was decided that its sphere of activity was to oover both 
North and Central America, a idecision which was justified by the 
geographical proximity of Central America and the economic and 
political influence of the United States in this region. 
The charactenistic feature of the formation of AGA subsidiary 
companies in thlis part of the world is that it took place after the 
AGA company had gained a footing on the market. The explana- 
tion lies in the malre-up of the AGA range of products. 
The formation of subsidiary companies at the beginning of the 
1920s was characterized by the attempts made )by AGA to restrict 
its share of the financing to the ~minimtum and yet to retain the 
formal and actual management of the new units. Native interests 
were invited to sutbscribe for shares in the companies, partly in 
oader to form influential contacts and partly to acquire risk-lbearing 
capital in the country in which the subsidiary was being established. 
The risk to AGA capital in  the formation of the subsidiary com- 
panies was also reduced by the parent company in several cases 
contributing its proportion of the share capital by granting the right 
to use AGA patents and by providing the subsidiary company 
with AGA products and materials for its eguipment. 
11f all the AGA foreign venbures are taken into account, a clear 
connection may be discerned between the profitability of the com- 
pany and its rformations of foreign su~bsidiaries a t  different times. 
During the 1920s the parent company made large profits and ten 
foreign su~bsidiaries were set up. About 1920 there was a halt in 
this development. Further foreign ventures a t  the end of the 1920s 
coincided with a period fin which the parent company made in- 
creased profits. During the depression years the con~pany's prof- 
itability decreased, no subsidiaries were established abroad and the 
company's efforts had to be concentrated on the econon~ic re-orga- 
nization of thle subsidiaries which made losses dur'ing these years. 
Unlike its European activities, the Latin American activities of 
the AGA company display a striking continuity. I n  all the Latin 
American countries in which the company established subsidiaries, 
i t  has continued to be represent'ed. The g o w t h  in profitability of 
the Latin American companies during the inter-war years can only 
be indicated on account of the paucity of the available data. How- 
ever, duIllng the 1920s and 1930s these companies seem to have 
been the ones which caused the greatest financial worries within 
the group. For example, it may ,be ,mentioned that the Mexican 
subsidiary, which could be described as having been over-dimen- 
sioned during the 1930s, accumulated debts to the parent company 
during the first few years of the decade amounting to 0.7 million 
Swedish kronor. This sum was written off in 1935. 
In 1907 a telephone company managed by a Swedish financial 
syndicate comtmenced operations in Mexico. From 1909 onwards, 
its operations were maintained by Mexikanska Telefonaktiebolaget 
Ericsson (MTE), a subsidiary of the Swedish telephone company 
AB L. M. Ericsson. In  1904 it had been proposed that the Swedish 
company should take over a telephone concession for Mexico City. 
However, the concession did not involve any right to hold a mono- 
poly and the Swedes started operations in Mexico City in competi- 
tion with a much older, American-owned company, Cia Telegrltfica 
y Telef6nica Mexicana, usually called Mexicana. Up to the beginning 
the 1920s, the MTE operations were largely restricted to the 
Mexico City area, but alfterwards the company acquired concessions 
for other areas in the repuiblic and for interurban lines. 
The Swedish company scored some rapid successes. When the 
Mexican civil war broke out, the MTE already had as many sub- 
scritbers as its previously established rival. During the 1910s the 
company suhfered from the pressure of political and economic in- 
stability, which was manifested in anxiety amongst the staff, ap- 
prehensions lest the authorities should take action against the com- 
pany, and foreign-exchange Idifficulties. In spite of the number of 
subscribers, remaining static, the MTE succeeded in making profits 
during this period and escaped Government (interference, unlike 
the American-owned company, against which the Government *in- 
tervened>>. Under the political regimes of the 1920s, which were in 
general ifavourably disposed towards foreign businesses in the 
country, there was no anxiety in the MTE about nationalization 
or compulsory measures being taken #by the Government, as there 
had been under the radical and reformist Ckdenas regime. 
During the perio'd under study, i.e. up to the middle of the 1930s, 
the company was financed predominantly with Sweidish capital, 
but during Cirdenas's period as President (1934-1940) there was 
a tendency to choose to replace the Swedish capital by Mexican, 
since the company's investments were regarded as being at nisk under 
the disturibed political conditions. 
The situation as regarded competition with the American-owned 
Mexicana company was considered to be lfavourable during the 
first two decades. A proposal from $Mexicans for a merger in 1923 
was regarded as a sign of weakness in the rival company. After 
1925 the position of the American company improved, owing to 
$he facts that it was transferred to the International Telephone and 
Telegraphic Corporation (ITT) groap and received an advantageous 
concession. Disa~ssions about a merger took place during the 1930s, 
partly in a s i t~~at ion  i  which competition was suspended. In the 
period 1931-1943 no dividends wcre paid on the Swedish com- 
pany's shares. This reflected, on the one hand, the very large in- 
vestments which the company made in extending the telephone 
system from about 1930 and, on the other, the fact that during the 
1930s it was not allowed to raise the tariffs concurrently with the 
increases in costs and foreign-exchange rates. When in the middle 
of the 1930s the Mexican Government made far-reaching ldemands 
for joint traffic operations and the companies wished to discuss 
this matter in comection with the tariff and profitability questions, 
thc negotiations !between the Government, the MTE and the Mex- 
icana company reached a deadlock. 
Up to 1932 Svensku Tandsticksuktieboluget (STAB) (the Swedish 
Match Company) was an essential part of Ivar Kreuger's great 
international conzlsine. The STAB would seem to have had more 
extensive international commitments than any other Swedish manu- 
facturing company about 1930. 111 this thesis I have investigated its 
activities in Latin America, chiefly its four match monopolies in 
this part of the world. 
The STAB was founded in 1917 by the merger of a couple of 
match companies. This merger may be described as the terminal 
point in the structural transformation of the Swedish match industry 
which had been going on since the turn of the century. Ivar Kreuger 
was the drivling force in the final stage of this transformation. 
Under his direction the STAB was developed into a world-wide 
enterprise. A considerable number of foreign operating units were 
formed, particularly during the period 1925-1930. 
The Mreuger group's position in the world match industry was 
achieved by different methods. One of these methods was to buy 
up manufacturing companies and thereby gain control over a market. 
In this way the group became the de facto holder of a monopoly 
in certain countries. Another method was to make agreements with 
governments about the establishment of match monopolies or to take 
over already existing match monopolies administered by the gov- 
ernment concerned. These I have described as de jure monopolies. 
The STAB obtained collcessions for match monopolies from 15 
states. 
Latin America was not a new market for exports of Swedish 
matches when the STAB began to consolidate its position in country 
&er country )during the 1920s. Swedish matches had been exported 
in slmall quantities to Latin America as early as the 1870s. 
I n  some countries, the STAB, together with the English company 
Bryant and May, which was associated with the STAB, acquired 
interests in native manufacturing companies (in Argentina, Co- 
lombia and Umguay). In Chile the STAB gained control of the 
market through a subsidiary, which gradually bought up the com- 
peting firms. Shares in Mexican industrial firms were acquired via 
the subsidiary company in the USA, the International Match Cor- 
poration. 
Of particular interest are the STAB'S Latin American monopolies, 
which were established in Peru (1925), Ecuador (1927), Bolivia 
(1930) and Guatemala (1930). The concessions granted the STAB 
the sole rights, as regarded the manufacture, importation and sale 
of matches. The $duration of the contracts for the Latin American 
monopolies varied between 20 and 30 years. The contracts with 
Ecuador, Bolivia and Guatemala were combined with loans from 
the Kreuger group to the governments of these countries. The dura- 
tions of these loans were the same as the durations of the concessions 
and the contracts were drawn up in such a way that the annual 
concession fees paid by the company were equivalent to the interest 
and amortization payments on the loans, wich meant that in its 
capacity as lender  he company had a seourity for the loan in the 
annual fees paid to the government. 
These four monopolies involved disappointments for the STAB 
in different ways. Two of the concessions were cancelled by the 
governments concerned by unilateral action-in Ecuador in 1931 
and in Guatemala in 1939-anfd therefore the STAB ceased to 
occupy a legally protected monopoly position. I n  Guatemala the 
Swedish company succeeded in retaining a position on the market 
after diplomatic intervention by the Swedish Government and after 
Swedish importers had threatened to cease purchasing Guatemala 
coffee. Its true that the Guatemala Government did not give any 
real guarantees. In  the case of Ecuador the STAB was excluded 
from the market because its agreement with the Ayora government 
was declared unconstitutional. Diplomatic intervention by the Swed- 
ish Government had no effect in this case. As regarded Peru and 
Ecuador, the company's calculations were too optimistic. In  Peru 
this led to a financial seuback, if account is taken of the company's 
expenditure in acquiring the monopoly. The income which the 
, company derived from its management of the monopoly was too 
small in relation to the fees for the concession, and the agreement 
was cancellad in 1932 )by agreement between the Government and 
the company. In Bolivia smuggling and other difficulties helped to 
I keep the company's sales figures low. 
The death of Ivar Kreuger and the collapse of the Kreuger group 
in 1932 lineant that the STAB'S world-wide enterprise underwent 
a partial change. In Latin America the ties with the Mexican match 
companies were broken, since these companies were under the con- 
trol of the STAB offshoot in the USA, the International Match Co., 
which was declared bankmpt. Furthermore the company's goodwill 
would seem to have suffered from Kreuger's suicide and the serious 
charges that were levelled after his death against his financial 
activities. 
Kreuger's monopoly agreements were perhaps not so original as 
is conxnonly asserted. Certain circuinstances indicate that Kreuger 
got the idea of these ~ n o i l o p o l ~  agreements, which were later signed 
with 15 states, from an agreement made between the Argentine 
business man Bovet and the Bolivian Government. The combination 
of a loan to a government and a concession which involved a match 
monopoly was then developed step by step. 
From the AB Bofovs archives, which are very de'fective for the 
interwar years, I have only been able to procure some views on the 
company's arms sales in Latin America during this period. Statistical 
data on the Latin American transactions are almost completely 
lacking. This company differs from the other con~panies stuldied in 
that i t  has never esta~blished any Latin American subsidiaries. 
The modern history of the company begins with a couple of 
factory mergers during the [first half of the 1870s. Gradually, and 
particularly under the direction af Alfred Nobel, the manufacture 
of arms, especially cannon, became an important branch of the 
conlp~ny's activities. U p  to the First World War, the mark,et for 
~ ~ f ~ r s  remained largely restricted to the Scandinavian 
co~untries. 
Bofors did not make its real entry into the Latin American market 
until the beginning of the 1920s. I t  had made its way there for 
several reasons. The First World War was followed by a recession 
for the anmaments industries, a recession which was partly explained 
by the fact that several states, including Germany, were prevented 
froln re-arming by the stipulations of the 'Treaty of Versailles. The 
general endcavours for disarmament also helpad to reduce the de- 
mand for arms. Bofors, whose sales decreased heavily after the 
war, was able to  take over fro~m the German firm of Krupp a 
nulmber of Latin Ainerican coinmitinents which Kiupp could not 
meet. During 1922 ailld 1923 Bofors built up a network of agencies 
in Latin America. The firms and business houses which were linked 
with Bofors agents during these two years worked for Bofors during 
the 1920s and 1930s. O n  the outbreak of the Second World War, 
collaboration with the German firins which had Bofors agencies in 
Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires  became impossible. Moreover it 
was considered that Bofors bad become such a well-known name 
that i t  was no longer necessary to be represented by big interna- 
tional business houses. Accordingly in 1912 it  was decidod to build 
up in Latin America a network of agents consisting of Swedish and 
native firms. 
In its Latin American transactions, Bofors worked partly through 
the agencies just mentioned and partly through travelling repre- 
sentatives sent froim the Swedish headquarters. In  addition, i t  tried 
to infbence the purchasing commissions of the Latin American 
countries in Europe. 
The arms sales to Latin America seem to have been marked more 
than other Swedish >>Government deals* in this part of the world 
by the political sympathies and antipathies of the purchasing au- 
thorities towands the nationality of the salesmen. 
The patterns on which the AGA and the SKF foreign surbsidiaries 
were esta~blished show great similarities. The parent companies were 
started at approximately the same time (19Q4 and 1907). Both 
companies offered for sale on their foreign markets highly finished 
engineering products. The salesmen's technical skill was important 
in the marketing of these products. The SKF company endeavourec 
to )fill the agents' appoint~ments, posts at branches and importan$ 
positions in the subsidiary companies with its own people, trainec 
within the company. Similar conditions applied as regarded tlx 
AGA products and their manketing. 
For both AGA and SKF, the 1920s were a period of expansion 
on the foreign market, which was manifested, inter uliu, in the 
founding 01 subsidiary companies. The primary aim was to get a 
foothold in the most industrialized countries-the USA, Germany, 
France and England. Srltbsidiaries were also established in the Scan- 
dinavian countries at  an early date. The growth of the SKF company 
on the Latin American market was very similar to that of the AGA 
company, at  least in external respects: a number of subsidiaries of 
both were founded there about 1920. The SKF snbsidiarties in Latin 
America were sales companies, while the AGA subsidiaries were 
also manufacturing companies. For AGA, the manufacture of gas 
was an important part of the activities of the subsidiary companies; 
this was evidently one of the reasons for the change-over from 
agencies to subsidiaries. In the South American companies which 
were investigated as regarded AGA's activities, the company con- 
centrated chiefly on selling beacons and buoys. The purchasers 
secured in this way were dependent on supplies of gas from the 
company. Thus, another stage in the development began with the 
supply to the customers of locally produced gas. This gas had to be 
produced locally for reasons connected with transport economics 
anid thus the AGA company was inlduced to form a subsidiary. 
The Swedish Sepal-ntor company came to Latin America earlier 
than either AGA or SICF. Its main product was milk separators. 
It had at  a very early stage a well-developed network of agencies 
over practically the whole world. Around the turn of the century 
Separator had four agents in Latin America. Before the Second 
World War it had only one subsidiary in this part of the world, 
viz. in Argentina. 
A comparison 'between the above-mentioned companies and the 
STAB shows that the STAB'S Latin American ventures were dif- 
ferently structured on several points. Like the other companies, it 
supplied a prolduct whose manufacture was the result of advanced 
technical development and rationalization. However, the STAB 
achieved a quite different position on the world market. I t  has 
been stated that, when the Swedish match group was a t  its most 
expansive stage, i t  was responsible for two-thirfds of the world 
of matches. The STAB had exceptionally good financial 
resources through its connection with Kreuger & Toll. I have 
strongly emphasized in the thesis that the STAB's activity must be 
considered in connection with Ivar Kreuger's overall financial ac- 
tivities. The STAB's Latin American ventures were administratively 
less uniform than those of the other companies discussed and it 
conquered new markets in ways which might vary considerably 
from country to country. 
Relations between companies and authorities 
The discussion of the companies' relations to the authorities will 
here be widened into a discussion of the problem of corruption in 
Latin America and of the po~si~bilities of making empirical investiga- 
tions of this problem. 
In modern sociological literature the discussion of the problem 
of corruption in developing countries is markedly theoretical. There 
are few empirical investigations of corruption, but it is often declared 
that lrnowledge of the causes and effects of corruption cannot be 
appreciably increased unless the factual basis is widened. The absence 
of empirical investigations may be explained by the difficulty of 
collecting material: whoever wishes to make studies of corruption 
must assuredly be content with a comparatively small number of 
facts. 
I t  woluld seem to be convenient to distinguish between corruption 
on three dififerent levels: (a) political corruption, (b) corruption in 
law courts and the public administration, and (c) corruption in a 
private administration. >,Political corruption,, means chiefly bar- 
gaining for votes in general elections. Corruption in the public ad- 
ministration means that salaried employees of the government and 
the municipality and elected political representatives allow them- 
selves, in dealing with a~dministrative matters, to be influenced by 
personal gifts or promises (from those affected by the decisions. 
In  the dollowing pages the discussion is limited to corruption in 
the public administration, particularly bribery. The following groups 
of source material can be used \for empi'rical investigations of ad- 
. ministrative corruption: 
(a) Material slupplied by individual persons and companies (in- 
formation given by the bribers). 
(b) The adm(inistrative material. 
(c) The private material supplied by the officials in the public 
service (inEormation given by the receivers of bribes). 
(d) Reports of investigations, mainly the results of investigations 
arranged by a government or legislature. 
(e) Newspapers. 
( f )  Interviews. 
I have enumerated above the material which is primarily of 
interest as regards the actual relation )between the giver of bribes 
anld the receiver. In  addition, there are, inter alia, the laws and 
ordinances designed to suppress or to >>regulate), corruption. 
The study olf corruption will only be completely meaningful when 
i t  can be illustrated in its political, economic and social contexts. 
I t  is particularly important that i t  sholuld be possible to apply the 
results to knowledge of the fui~ctionin~g of the administration in 
the actual country, the conditions od recruitment and employment, 
the spoils system, the salary conditions, etc. 
The relati,onship between the giver and receiver of bribes is charac- 
terized by a confidentiality which is inherent in the nature of the 
transaction. This means that documents ,deriving from the actual 
transaction will )be rare. A government official will keep quiet 
about how much (money he has received froim individual persons 
to  make or  to influence the making of an administrative decision. 
The consequence of this for the .historian of corruptions will be 
that he will be faced with difficult problems regarding his sources. 
The number of surviving documents will be small; narrative sources 
-often of a second-hand or third-hand character and of a strongly 
tendentious nature-will be the main initial material. The above- 
mentioned groups oif source \material ail have their special problems 
with reference to source criticism. 
I am definitely of the 'opinion that the archives of the foreign 
subsidiaries contain mater'ial that would [be valuable for the study 
of corruption in Latin American government atdlministrations. The 
most important part consists of letters exchanged between the parent 
companies and their su~bsi~diaries, representatives and agents. This 
correspondence is of a confidential character and is generally of 
high value as source material. The discussion of the planning of 
business deals, iillformation about business agreements, and accounts 
of local economic, political and comn~ercial conditions often yield 
inforination about corruption in one or more respects. However, 
the actual collection of lmaterial from the companies involves con- 
siderable difficulties, since the companies which co-operate run the 
risk of feeling themselves accused. 
I t  ,may be noted that commissions paid to administrative officials 
and politicians were of importance as regarded all the investigated 
Swedish companies which did business with public authorities in 
Latin America. With reference to the AGA business deals during 
the 1910s in Argentina, Brazil and Chile and during the 1920s in 
Pem, Ecuador and Mexico, such financial payments may be de- 
scribed as forming a recurrent pattern. 
As regands BGA and STAB, it has been observed that in certain 
situations these companiles allied themselves with members of parlia- 
ment, who received remmer~ation for their actions in connection 
with parliamentary decisions on concessions or the purchase of 
equipment. One of the purposfes of these alliances was to ensure 
that the actual matters would ,be placed on the agenda quickly and 
dealt with quickly. I t  may be assumed that senators or deputies 
who took an active part on behalf of the companiles were also 
prepared to engage in political agitation on their behalf. Since in 
that case it  was a matter of parliamentary lolbbying, i t  is naturally 
difficlult or impossi~ble to elucidate what occurred. 
In  selling its beacons and lightled ~buoys, the AGA company estab- 
lished contacts with key officials in the public administrations in 
Chile, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina. These officials acted, soine- 
times for long periods, as the company's representatives vis-d-vis 
the authoritiles. Thus, the company secured representatives in the 
authorities' internal decision-making processes. I t  has been possible 
to show &at a key group of olfficials who bad been engaged on 
behalf of the company worked as the right-hand men of director- 
generals (or officials od corresponding rank) in the administrative 
units and departments in which the matter was dealt with pre- 
liminarily. Several (of these men were engineers. From them the 
company was able to obtain up-to-date particulars about tenders 
and prices and information about rivals and the standpoints of 
officials who presented reports on purchasing matters. The contact 
men normally received financial r~enlluneratioi from the company 
or its representatives. 
I t  has previously been stated that the amount of ,>pressure,, which 
the AGA company brought to bear (in different countries varied, 
both in intensity and as regarded the rank in the decision-making 
process of the officals who were ~,pressurcd~~.  I n  Argentina during 
the period 1906-1914 and in Mexico during the 1920s, its contacts 
with the President playe~d a large part. 
The Swedish companies' relations with the adininistrativc officials 
and politicians must also be considered in connection with the forms 
of the spoils systlem which existed in the different states. I do not 
know of any systematic investigations concerning the spoils system 
in Latin America and it  is difficult to state the exact scale of this 
phenomenon. However, it is evident that changcs of officc-holders 
in changes of political power influenced the companies' sales posi- 
tions to a large extent. The effect of the spoils systom on the com- 
panies' actions may be stated in the following typical cases. 
(a) When an official on whom the company has bestowed its 
money, timc and powers of persuasion is removed from his post, 
this mleans, of course, that the work which the company has put 
in has been wholly or partly in vain. I t  has then to begin again 
from the beginning with his successor or work through other chan- 
nels. 
(b) When facod with an impending change of office-holder or 
notice of such a change in an administrative post that is important 
for the closing of a business deal, the company may either (1) stop 
bringing pressure to bear through the official concerned and instead 
play a waiting game, concentrating on trying to influence his suc- 
cessor, or (2) !make further efforts and bring more pressure to bear 
on the contact (man in question, so that he will manage to perform 
the necessary services for the company before his departure. 
(c) When an important official in the administration takes a 
clearly negative attitude to the company, attempts are made to work 
through 0 t h  channels (president or minister), when faced with 
an approaching change of political power, in order to get this 
official replaced by a wmore suitable, person. 
Cases (d) and (b, 1) are the types which occur most often in the 
material investigawd. Changes in the posts of president or minister 
led, almost without exception, to decreased activity in the relations 
between the companies and the governments. The concrete result, 
as far as the companies were concerned, was delay in eliciting the 
intended orders. 
The agreements between the Swedish companies and thteir c,ontact 
men were, as a rule, oral ones. However, a few ,drafts of agree- 
ments in writing have (been discovered. T'he contact man's task 
was to ensure that the ord'ers went to the company and, in certain 
- .  
cases, to try and see to it that the administration's payments for 
the equipment delivered came in. From the cases which it has been 
possible to study, it is clear that the contact man's remuneration 
was in proportion to the authorities' purchases from the company. 
In the AGA business Ideals in Brazil, Argentina and Chile before 
the First World War, 5OIo was a common amount. In Peru during 
the 1920s the corresponding percentage was higher. 
In the material preserved in the Swedish companies' archives, 
the >,commission system,, (brilbery) has, quite naturally, chiefly 
figured as a source of information atbout the effects of the system 
on the companies, who paid the commissions. I t  is more difficult 
to assess the social and economic efifects (on the recipients and the 
Latin American comrmunities with raference to these isolated ob- 
servations. I t  is clear that the system was established in connection 
with business deals with governments. Thus the Swedish companies 
adapted themselves to an economic and political system which they 
were able to influence only to a very small extent. 
In several business deals between Swedish companies and Latin 
American govern~ments, it as been observed that the bribery system 
had the effect of increasing the price level. On the one hand, the 
companies' connections with the officials led to the limitation of 
competition, as, of course, the decisive factors were not high quality 
and low price but instead the fact that the sellers had the right 
contacts, and, on the other, the companies' expenditures on com- 
missions were incorporated in the quotation and thus charged to the 
purchaser. 
A special difficulty arose for AGA and Bofors in Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, when oflficials and politicians had distinct pro- 
English, pro-French or pro-German sympathies or the corresponding 
antipathies. The reason for mch attitudes to di5ferent nations would 
seem to  have been that officers from England, France and Germany 
were engaged as organizers and instructors in the armed forces of 
the countries concerned. These ojfficers were able to create goodwill 
for their countrymen and could influence the official purchases 
to  a large extent, owing to the fact that, officially or unofficially, 
they were also acting for  armaments manufacturers or other Gom- 
panies. An isolated Swedish example of this coinbination was Allbert 
Holmgren, who was an officer and chief instructor in the Chilean 
Navy anld later worked as the AGA representative and supplier 
of !beacons to the Chilean $Government. 
There is plenty of evi'dence that these fixations on the English, 
the French and the Germans could be sustained by bribery and 
corruption, whereby officials for long periods ,loyallys saw to it 
that the orders went to the right quarters. The system would seem 
to have greatly restricted competition. I t  may be assumed that 
companies which wished to get into the ,market in order to introduce 
products in competition with the established suppliers had to pay 
their contact men high (fees, with the result that the ~commissions,~ 
(ibribes) were raised and the corrluption increased. 
I have been a~ble to supplement the account of the Swedish com- 
panies' relations with the authorities, especially as regards ]the pay- 
ment of bribes, with information about the business methods of 
North American armaments 4irms in Latin America during the 
inter-war years. This information bas [been taken from the report 
of the US Senate Committee (the Nye Committee), which examined 
the American armaments industry in 1934-1936. The material 
provides evidence that it was com~monly impossible to make sales 
to the authorities without giving sums of money to the officials 
re~ponsi~ble for making decisions (there were a good many terms for 
these sums of money, most of which were euphemisms). I n  this 
material, as in the Swedish material, there are indications that the 
bribes paid under the Leguia regime in Peru during the 1920s were 
unusually high. I t  may also \be observed that the effects of the 
bribery system on the prices  fixed ,by the companies were the same 
as they were with respect to the Swedish companies, viz. the ex- 
penditure on bribes was included when the price was calculated. 
~t is difficult to express in general terms what reperc~ussions the 
spoils system and its influence on the administration's way of 
wofiking had on the Swedish companies' sales efforts. However, 
everything indicates that in the countries studied it is possible to  
discern periodicities in the companies' efforts and successes on the 
sales side. This periodicity has not been regarded as having been 
dependent on fluctuations in the economic situation, which certainly 
also had their efifects on the sales figures, but as having been related 
to the political developments in the different countries. On  account 
of the structurc of the decision-making apparatus, with its hierar- 
chical organization and developed spoils system, a clear adaptation 
to the periods of presidential office was observed in Uruguay (1909- 
1914), Mexico (especially during the 1920s) and Arigentina (the 
191Qs and 1920s). N o  counterpart to this was traced in Chile, where 
there were olbviously collegial forms of decision-making, as regarded 
sales of AGA 'beacons and Bofors arms. The usual effeclt of the 
spoils system was that the companies were unable to commence new 
deals or to concl~tde complicated negotiations during a period of 
about a year \before a presidential election. 
